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NOTES
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The atrocities committed during the past century evince
the need for the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court to investigate and prosecute those who would
repeat such crimes in the next century. Indeed, the interna-
tional criminal acts which were committed during the World
Wars, and more recently in Rwanda and the former Yugosla-
via, illustrate both the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals and the
unfortunate reality that international crimes will continue to
plague the global community into the next century.1 Accord-
ingly, it is imperative that ongoing efforts by the International
Criminal Court Preparatory Committee to finalize the text of a
draft statute continue, so that an international treaty estab-
lishing the court will be ratified and entered into force as soon
as possible.2
Ideally, the proposed International Criminal Court (ICC)
will bring about a sharp decline, if not total cessation, of inter-
national criminal conspiracy. At the very least, the ICC will
strengthen the resolve of the international community and put
on notice those who may be contemplating commission of pro-
hibited acts that the international community will no longer
1. M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years:
The Need to Establish A Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 11, 12 (1997).
2. International Criminal Court Homepage (visited Jan. 21, 1998)
<httplwww.igc.apc.orgicc>. At the conclusion of the Preparatory Committee's third
session on February 21, 1997, "the Committee recommended that the United Na-
tions General Assembly accepted Italy as host of a plenipotentiary conference on
the creation of the proposed court, to be held in Rome in June 1998." See United
Nations Press Release 112837, Aug. 1, 1997.
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tolerate such conduct. On a policy level, the existence of a
permanent institution to prosecute international criminals in a
timely manner will send a powerful message to the world com-
munity that abhorrent conduct will be dealt with in a swift
and equitable manner. The result will be two-fold. First, ensur-
ing that swift justice takes place will provide victims and the
law-abiding international community with the security that
the guilty will be made to answer for their actions. Second, the
existence of a permanent institution to prosecute international
crime will represent a significantly more powerful deterrent
than the current response of creating ad-hoc tribunals.3 For
these reasons, the current initiative to bring the ICC onto the
international arena should be given the strongest support from
all nations.
Certain political realities must be faced in order for the
tribunal to be a credible institution in the international com-
munity. Specifically, the unqualified support of a superpower
like the United States will lend essential credibility to the
ICC.' Significant American involvement within the ICC will
not only encourage its allies to follow suit, but also advance
U.S. national security interests by providing an international
forum to prosecute those responsible for crimes such as the
Lockerbie incident. Before the United States will submit its
citizens to jurisdiction under an international criminal tribu-
nal, the specific language of the ICC statute must be closely
scrutinized to ensure that it contains adequate due process
guarantees and is not in conflict with the U.S. Constitution.
This Note will discuss the issue of trial in absentia, which
the ICC Draft Statute Article 37 permits under certain circum-
stances, and how this conflicts with existing U.S. law.' It is
my position that U.S. opposition to trial in absentia should not
stand in the way of U.S. membership in the ICC. First, U.S.
opposition to trial in absentia is not absolute.6 Second, the
3. Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal
That Overcomes Past Objections, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POLy 419, 438 (1995).
4. See Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal
Court, 6 PACE INTL L. REV. 103, 109 (1994).
5. Report of the Preparatory Committee on International Criminal Court, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996), art. 37(a)(b)
[hereinafter Draft Statute]. The Draft Statute also contains extensive commentary
by the International Law Commission [hereinafter Commentary].
6. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
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importance of the policy objectives advanced by the ICC, which
are shared by the United States, outweigh U.S. opposition to
the objectionable ICC provisions for trial in absentia. Finally,
the vast procedural guarantees the ICC provides for defen-
dants demonstrates that the Court will not be a sham, and is
thus worthy of U.S. support.
Part II will outline the history of the international crimi-
nal court, and recent efforts by the International Law Commis-
sion (ILC) acting at the direction of the General Assembly of
the United Nations, to produce a draft statute establishing a
permanent international criminal court. This section will also
discuss the weaknesses of current and prior ad hoc tribunals,
and the manner in which the current ICC Draft Statute re-
sponds. Part III will provide a structural overview of the ICC,
and outline the policy considerations and practical arguments
involving trial in absentia in the context of an international
criminal court.' In addition, this Part will outline the proce-
dural guarantees within the ILC Draft Statute which are de-
signed to maximize individual rights for ICC defendants.
Part IV will consider the principle opposing trial in absen-
tia within the United States legal system, and analyze the
exceptions to this principle. These will be considered in light of
specific ICC provisions allowing for trial in absentia. Finally,
Part V will consider the weight of U.S. opposition to trial in
absentia against the benefits of establishing an international
criminal court equipped with in absentia authority. On a more
practical level, this section will offer arguments in support of
U.S. membership within the ICC in spite of apparent conflicts
with specific ICC provisions for trial in absentia. Moreover,
this Note will argue that specific policy considerations inherent
to the establishment of a credible international tribunal out-
weigh American opposition to trials in absentia, and that suffi-
7. Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37(2)(a)-(c) which states:
The Trial Chamber may order that the trial proceed in the absence of
the accused if-
(a) the accused is in custody, or has been released pending trial, and for
reasons of security or the ill health of the accused it is undesirable for
the accused to be present;
(b) the accused is continuing to disrupt the trial; or
(c) the accused has escaped from lawful custody under this Statute or
has broken bail.
Id. See also infra Part III.
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cient procedural safeguards are already present within the ICC
Draft Statute to guarantee fairness to defendants.8 In conclu-
sion, this Note will argue that the need for a permanent inter-
national tribunal and necessity of securing U.S. involvement is
imperative and does not violate any constitutional freedoms.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The notion of international criminal law is by no means a
twentieth-century phenomenon. One of the earliest prosecu-
tions for international criminal conduct took place during the
fifteenth century, involving a 27 member tribunal of the Holy
Roman Empire, which convicted a military commander for
crimes his subordinates committed against civilians.9 A more
recent effort to establish an international criminal court, how-
ever, can be traced to Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles
which specifically named Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II and
accused him of "a supreme offence against international moral-
ity and the sanctity of treaties."0 Despite calls for interna-
tional prosecutions of war criminals, the zeal to prosecute al-
leged World War I criminals was defeated by political expedi-
ence and factors such as the Kaiser's flight to the Nether-
lands." Although proponents of an international criminal
tribunal made specific suggestions to League of Nations offi-
cials, no official action was taken during the inter-war peri-
od.'2
Stories about the unspeakable atrocities being committed
by the Nazis during and before the outbreak of World War II
(1939-1945) were well known by Allied leaders at a relatively
early period during the war. 3 Indeed, as early as 1941 the
decision was made by British officials to create an internation-
al war tribunal to prosecute Nazi war criminals, ultimately
leading to the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. 4 In response to claims that the Nuremberg tribu-
8. Id. art. 41.
9. See Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an
International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 76-77 (1995).
10. Id. at 79 (quoting Treaty of Peace with Germany [Treaty of Versailles],
June 28, 1919, 2.Bevans 43).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 80.
13. Id. at 81.
14. Id. See also 1 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War
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nal violated ex-post facto principles of law, the newly estab-
lished United Nations created a committee which was respon-
sible for "codifying and legitimizing those principles... "
which had been articulated by the Nuremberg and Far East
Tribunals. 5 Because of insurmountable problems having to do
with enforcement provisions and reorientation, the prospect of
establishing an international criminal tribunal was tabled. 6
No serious debate continued for the next three decades. Dis-
agreements regarding jurisdictional issues, coupled with the
increasing frigidity of U.S.-Soviet relations culminated in 1957
when "the Sixth (Legal) Committee postponed consideration of
both court and code indefinitely on the recommendation of the
[International Law Commission]."17
The idea of an international criminal court nevertheless
remained alive in academic circles and received new interest
during the 1970s largely due to charges during the Vietnam
War (1963-1974) that American servicemen involved in the
notorious My Lai incident should be treated as war crimi-
nals." Ironically, the most recent push for a permanent inter-
national criminal tribunal is not directly attributable to war
crimes. Rather, international drug trafficking during the 1980's
and the collateral violence it continues to generate throughout
the world have been the central motivating forces for the most
recent initiative to create an international criminal court. 9 In
response to requests by the Government of Trinidad, the Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly has reconvened the International
Law Commission and directed it to work on making "concrete
proposals for consideration.""0 Revelations of the crimes being
committed in the former Yugoslavia and later in Rwanda have
undoubtedly added a sense of urgency to the ILC's efforts.2
The grisly images from both Bosnia and Rwanda combined
with the ending of the Cold War provide sobering illustrations
Criminals 171 (1947).
15. See Marquardt, supra note 9, at 83-84.
16. Id. at 84. It should be noted, however, that Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, a
French Representative, submitted concrete proposals for an international criminal
court to the committee associated with the League of Nations. Id.
17. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 87. See also Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
19. See Marquardt, supra note 9, at 90.
20. Id. at 91.
21. Id. at 92.
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of the need to seize the current geopolitical climate and bring
the International Criminal Court into existence.
In November 1994, the ILC's final version of the Draft
Statute was presented to the Sixth Committee of the 49th
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.22 A
recommendation was included with the Draft Statute calling
for a conference of plenipotentiaries to draft a treaty to enact
the statute.' In December 1995, a Preparatory Committee
was created by the General Assembly and directed to meet
twice in 1996 in order to complete final revisions of the text for
presentation to a treaty conference.24 During the period be-
tween March 1996 and December 1997 the Preparatory Com-
mittee has convened on five occasions.' A sixth meeting took
place in March 1998.26 On December 17, 1997, the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution renewing
the mandate calling for the convening of an international trea-
ty conference to establish the International Criminal Court in
1998.27 Italy has offered the city of Rome to serve as site for
the conference which took place in July 1998.'
Although ICC proponents are eager to meet the 1998 tar-
get date, members have also been cautious to avoid incorporat-
ing past mistakes into the current ICC Draft Statute. In many
respects, the ICC Draft Statute stands on the shoulders of the
ground breaking work done at Nuremberg as well as the ongo-
ing work being done at the Hague and in Tanzania under the
auspices of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), respectively. More importantly, the ICC
Draft Statute addresses three critical weaknesses which have
hindered the five ad hoc tribunals which have existed between
1919 and 1994. These weaknesses are: lack of independence,
logistical inefficiency, and credibility as an objective institution
of justice.0
22. See International Criminal Court Homepage, supra note 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 58-62.
30. Id.
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A. Independence
The permanence and independence of the ICC will argu-
ably be its greatest strengths. These characteristics will most
clearly distinguish the ICC from its predecessors which were
hastily put together in the wake of events such as the signing
of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the Holocaust, and the
horrors recently visited upon citizens in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda."' The ICC will ideally be immune from the polit-
ical pressures which have historically been brought to bear on
ad hoc tribunals and have impeded the search for justice. 2
Specifically, concerns about the stability of Germany's Weimar
Republic following the signing of the Treaty of Versailles
prompted the Allies to abandon proposed prosecutions of al-
leged German war criminals, including the German Emperor
who never stood trial."3 In addition, post-World War II U.S.
foreign policy, which was designed both to foster an enduring
peace and halt an expanding Soviet Union, took on a higher
national priority than prosecuting alleged war criminals in
Germany and Japan for acts committed during wartime.'
Most recently, the controversies surrounding the efforts of
the ICTFY and ICTR illustrate the modern-day need for the
establishment of a permanent independent tribunal at the
earliest opportunity. 5 In 1992, the United Nations Security
Council commissioned a panel of experts to look into reports of
"grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other viola-
tions of international humanitarian law... " that were taking
place in Yugoslavia.36 In what would ultimately become the
"world's largest rape investigation," the Commission, which
also included governmental representatives and volunteers,
amassed enough evidence to infer a conspiracy on the part of
high ranking officials. 7 Pursuant to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 808, the ICTFY was established on May 25,
31. See generally id.
32. Id. at 58.
33. Id.; Jelena Pejic, What Is An International Criminal Court? As Negotia-
tions On the Establishment of An ICC Start, The Debate Heats Up, 23 HUM. RTS.
Q. 16, 16 (Fall 1996).
34. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 58-59.
35. Id. at 44-45.
36. Id. at 39.
37. Id. at 41.
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1993.8 Notably, one of the goals of the ICTFY was to serve as
a model for a permanent international criminal court.39 Al-
though as a judicial institution the ICTFY is technically con-
sidered an independent entity, the Security Council's adminis-
trative control over the tribunal has prompted criticism. At
least one critic has characterized the Security Council's admin-
istrative decision to abruptly end the Commission's investiga-
tions by April 30, 1994, as "an obstruction of justice."0 This
decision, along with the delay in appointing Chief Prosecutor
Richard Goldstone, has been attributed by critics to the pursuit
of "the political peace process" 41 which clearly had no prospect
for success if the negotiators themselves were faced with crimi-
nal indictments." Thus, a political climate favoring negotia-
tions over the pursuit of justice, coupled with inefficient U.N.
budgetary procedures, has resulted in few ICTFY prosecu-
tions.43
It is logical, therefore, to infer that an international crimi-
nal tribunal charged with the difficult task of investigating
and prosecuting alleged war criminals cannot operate effective-
ly in an atmosphere where international pressure can be
brought to bear in order to advance even the most well-inten-
tioned goals. In other words, any tribunal which can be exploit-
ed as a bargaining chip in a negotiating process has the poten-
tial to be rendered moot. For this reason, it is hoped that the
permanence and independence 4 of the ICC will shield it from
having to compromise an investigation or prosecution in order
to facilitate the achievement of urgent short-term objectives
such as a cease-fire agreement or the brokering of a hostage
release agreement."5
38. Id. at 42-43.
39. See Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing An International Crimi-
nal Court, 6 DUKE J. COhm. & INTL L. 167, 168 (1995).
40. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 42.
41. Id at 59.
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id. at 44-45.
44. It is important to note that the ICC will probably receive its funding from
the United Nations, and/or from future treaty nations. See Draft Statute, supra
note 5, art. 2(6). In addition, the U.N. Security Council does reserve the right to
refer matters to the ICC for investigation as one of the methods for triggering an
investigation. However, the ICC Draft Statute does not provide authority for the
U.N. Security Council to terminate an investigation or prosecution, and has no
authority to remove or influence the prosecutor.
45. Id. art. 10 which provides for the independence of ICC judges and prohib-
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B. Logistical Inefficiency
The practical advantages which will be achieved by estab-
lishing a permanent international criminal tribunal cannot be
overstated. Simply stated, the mere existence of the ICC will
avert the time consuming political and logistical processes
which invariably accompany calls for establishing an ad hoc
tribunal following the revelation of atrocities.46 Perhaps even
more importantly, the existing framework providing for inves-
tigative, indictment and trial procedures within the ICC Draft
Statute will reduce the chances of guilty parties fleeing prose-
cution and prevent ongoing hostilities from taking a greater
human toll by eliminating the delay period between the deci-
sion to establish an ad hoc tribunal and its entry into force.47
While the international community debates whether a set of
circumstances warrants the establishment of an ad hoc tribu-
nal, crucial time is lost. Bypassing this step will not only have
the effect of removing a significant bureaucratic hurdle, but
also will increase the effectiveness of investigations and the
likelihood of apprehending suspects."
Having a permanent tribunal already in place along with
an administrative staff and investigators would probably have
reduced significantly the ongoing difficulties faced by the
ICTR. Issues as fundamental as selecting a suitable site for
the ICTR and the logistics of transporting witnesses and de-
fendants were met by protracted debate that not only spent
limited resources, but also taxed the resolve of the Security
Council.49 Although there are 75,000 people in Rwandan jails
awaiting trial, to date there has been only one conviction for
the crime of genocide." Moreover, the decision to have Chief
its judges from holding office in "legislative or executive branches of a Government
of a State, or of a body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of crimes."
See also art. 23 which permits 'jurisdiction . . . with respect to crimes . . . as a
consequence of the referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council ...
of the United Nations."
46. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 60.
47. See Jamison, supra note 3, at 438.
48. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 61.
49. See id. at 49. Senior counsel to then U.S. Ambassador to the United Na-
tions, Madeline K. Albright, characterized the Council's experience "micromanaging"
the ICTR as "Tribunal Fatigue." Id. For recent discussions on the logistical prob-
lems facing the ICTR, see, James C. McKinley Jr., On 1994 Blood Bath In Rwan-
da, Tribunal Hews to a Glacial Pace, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1997, at Al; Barbara
Crossette, U.N. Told A Tribunal Needs Help, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1998, at A4.
50. See James C. McKinley Jr., Ex-Rwandan Premier Gets Life in Prison on
19991
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Prosecutor Goldstone oversee prosecutions under the ICTFY
and the ICTR has had the unintended effect of causing further
delays. Specifically, critics have noted that the notion of requir-
ing one person to "oversee two major sets of prosecutions sepa-
rated by 10,000 miles... is nothing short of absurd."5 While
the Security Council's intentions to create a "unity of legal ap-
proach" and conserve resources are commendable, in practice
the result has detrimentally affected the ICTR.52
In contrast, the ICC will avert having to "micromanage"
the details of setting up a tribunal in remote corners of the
globe as one will already be in place.53 Additionally, valuable
resources and time will not be wasted negotiating and con-
structing an acceptable site to hold trials.' Moreover, the ICC
Prosecutor will be able to rely on Deputy Assistants and have
the ability to seek additional aid in the event of multiple prose-
cutions.5" Being able to provide swift justice will not only pro-
duce a greater deterrent effect on future international criminal
conduct, but also will assist in providing closure for victim
groups and their families. While the logistical issues the ICC
will remedy are essential tools for it to accomplish its stated
goals, the ICC as an institution of international justice carries
with it significantly broader objectives: establishing precedent
and credibility as legal authority for future prosecutions.
C. Credibility as Legal Authority
A permanent international criminal court will establish
concrete legal precedent as a foundation for future prosecu-
tions against international criminal defendants. The Draft
Statute sets forth its subject matter jurisdiction which allows
it to prosecute those accused of crimes of genocide, crimes of
aggression, crimes that constitute "serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in armed conflict [and] crimes
against humanity."56 Simply stated, the ICC will legitimize
international criminal prosecution and put to rest the defense
Charges of Genocide in '94 Massacres, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at A4.
51. Bassiouni supra note 1, at 48.
52. Id. at 47-49.
53. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 3(1).
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 12(2).
56. Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 20.
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of "nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime
without law, no punishment without law)" which has under-
mined the integrity of international criminal prosecutions."
By establishing binding legal precedent within a perma-
nent court which is confined to a limited and well defined
subject matter jurisdiction, the ICC will render moot the en-
during criticism initially leveled at the Nuremberg and Far
East Tribunals that war crimes prosecutions are illustrations
of victor's justice." The fact that ICC judges will not answer
to any individual nation, or group of nations should reduce the
effect of bias charges.59 Moreover, the Draft Statute specifical-
ly prohibits any judge from being a member of a trial chamber
when that judge "is a national of a complainant State or of a
State of which the accused is a national." ° Finally, the provi-
sions with regard to ICC investigations, the handing down of
indictments, pre-trial discovery, and trial procedures ensures
fair treatment for defendants.6 Thus, over the long term the
establishment of the ICC will strengthen the legal basis for
future international criminal prosecutions by creating a body
of law under a single court as opposed to having to rely on the
findings of ad hoc tribunals each of which is governed by indi-
vidual charters.
Il. OVERVIEW OF THE ICC AND TRIALS IN ABSENTIA
Prior to examining the constitutional implications of Amer-
ican participation within the ICC, and more particularly, grap-
pling with the issue of permitting trials in absentia, an outline
of the ICC's fundamental components is necessary. According-
ly, the following section will discuss the ICC's proposed struc-
ture, its subject-matter jurisdiction, triggering mechanisms and
57. Jamison, supra note 3, at 437.
58. See, e.g., Joy Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: The History and
Meaning of its Politicization, 23 BROKM J. INTL L. 691, 763 (1998); Herbert
Kraus, The Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals: Reflections After Seven-
teen Years, 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 243 (1964).
59. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 10(1) which states "[uin performing
their functions, the judges shall be independent."; Draft Statute, supra note 5, art.
10(7) states "[no judge who is a national of a complainant State or of a State of
which the accused is a national shall be a member of a chamber dealing with the
case."
60. Id.
61. Id. at arts. 25-30, 37-41.
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procedural guarantees to defendants.
A. Structure of the ICC
Article 5 of the Draft Statute identifies the four compo-
nents of the court: "(a) a Presidency... ; (b) an Appeals Cham-
ber, Trial Chambers, and other chambers... ; (c) a
Procuracy... ; and (d) a Registry.. . ." The President, as
well as first and second Vice-Presidents, are elected by a ma-
jority of the eighteen ICC judges. The President's two main
duties are to select and serve along with six ICC judges in an
Appellate Chamber, and choose a panel of five ICC judges to
form a Trial Chamber to hear individual cases." The
Procuracy serves as the independent prosecutorial branch of
the ICC and consists of a Prosecutor and Assistant Deputy
Prosecutors, who are elected by a majority of state parties for
renewable five year terms." Significantly, the Draft Statute
commentary emphasizes the importance of maintaining the
independence of the prosecutor's office, and expressly prohibits
any ICC Prosecutor or Judge from involvement in a case deal-
ing with an individual "of the same nationality."65
The Registry will function as the administrative wing of
the ICC and serve as a liaison between the court and member
states."
B. Crimes Under the ICC
Article 20 of the Draft Statute enumerates five areas in
which the ICC will assume subject-matter jurisdiction: "(a) the
crime of genocide; (b) the crime of aggression; (c) serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict;\(d)
crimes against humanity; [and] (e) crimes established un-
der.., treaty provisions [which] constitute exceptionally seri-
ous crimes of international concern."67 With the exception of
the crime of genocide, which has been defined and recognized
throughout most of the international community," each of the
62. Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 5.
63. See David Steelting, Report on the Proposed International Criminal Court,
52 THE REcORD 79, 94-95 (1997). See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 8.
64. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 8(2).
65. Commentary, supra note 5, art. 12(2) & 12(4).
66. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 13.
67. Id. art. 20.
68. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
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other crimes has generated issues for debate.69
C. ICC Jurisdiction and Complementarity
The ICC Prosecutor may initiate an investigation only
upon the filing of a complaint by a state that is a party to the
ICC or in response to a referral from the United Nations Secu-
rity Council.70 As an "international penal tribunal,"7' the
ICC retains jurisdiction solely for the crime of genocide. How-
ever, with regard to the other crimes enumerated in Article 20,
the ICC may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction only after a
state has "expressed consent to be bound" under ICC jurisdic-
tion in its entirety or has sought ICC jurisdiction for a particu-
lar crime under Article 20.72 This method permits nation-
states to declare either complete acceptance of ICC jurisdiction
or "by way of a special declaration" provides nation-states the
choice of "opting-in" for specific crimes.73
An anticipated consequence of requiring state consent to
ICC jurisdiction is that it will be accompanied by significant
state cooperation which was largely absent during the investi-
gations in the former Yugoslavia.74 This absence of state coop-
eration continues to hamper ongoing efforts to bring the guilty
to justice in Rwanda.75 The Preamble to the ICC Draft Stat-
ute sets forth some general guidelines for when the ICC should
become involved in a matter. Specifically, it states:
The State parties to this Statute, desiring to further interna-
tional cooperation to enhance the effective prosecution and
suppression of crimes of international concern, and for that
purpose to establish an international criminal court; Empha-
sizing that such a court is intended to exercise jurisdiction
only over the most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole; Emphasizing further that such
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227, arts. II-HI; Stoelting, supra note 63, at 101.
69. For an excellent synopsis of the ICC, its background, and the controversy
regarding subject-matter jurisdiction under art. 20, see Stoelting, supra note 63, at
100-107.
70. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, at arts. 21(1)(a), 23(1), 25.
71. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 68. See also Stoelting, supra note 63, at 108.
72. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 22(1)(a).
73. Commentary, supra note 5, art. 22(2).
74. See Stoelting, supra note 63, at 110.
75. See Crossette, supra note 49.
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a court is intended to be complementary to national criminal
justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not
be available or may be ineffective.
76
Although clauses such as "may not be available" or "may
be ineffective" are superficially vague and open to several in-
terpretations, the Commentary section to the Preamble states
that the Court will intervene only where "there is no prospect
of those persons being duly tried in national courts" and explic-
itly identifies itself as a "complement to existing national juris-
dictions .... Essentially, this means that ICC intervention
should only occur after there has been a real opportunity for a
national criminal investigation and/or trial to take place. A
critical issue on this point is who decides whether an investiga-
tion or trial has been adequate.7' At least one ICC delegate
has expressed concern that this authority will be
disproportionately applied against developing countries whose
lack of resources are believed to limit their ability to prosecute
certain crimes. " While other delegates have suggested that it
is preferable "to risk infringing on national jurisdiction
than.., to allow perpetrators of crimes against humanity to
go unpunished... ," this issue is certain to resurface at fu-
ture ICC Preparatory Conferences."
D. ICC Guarantees to Defendants
ICC commentators generally agree that in order to pro-
mote the credibility of the court, the Draft Statute should pro-
vide significant procedural guarantees to those accused.81 Ac-
cordingly, the Draft Statute incorporates a number of funda-
76. Commentary, supra note 5, at preamble (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. See W. Andy Knight, Legal Issues, in A GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE
THE 51ST GENERAL ASSEmBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 261, 269 (John Tessitore &
Susan Woolfson eds., 1996).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Stoelting, supra note 63, at 112; Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,
Address to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court Regarding its Draft Statute (Aug. 11, 1997) (transcript available
upon request from author); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Position Paper,
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Major Unresolved Issues in the
Draft Statute 22 (Aug. 1996) (paper available from Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights).
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mental procedural guarantees including the presumption of
innocence, the burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the requirement that the accused receive prompt
notification regarding charges in a language that he/she under-
stands." Defendants are also allotted "adequate time" to con-
fer with an attorney, or have one appointed by the court to
prepare and put forth a defense." In addition, the Draft Stat-
ute provides for a speedy trial, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, a general right to be present at one's trial,
the right to have proceedings conducted in a language the
accused understands, and freedom from self-incrimination.'
Moreover, Draft Statute Article 41(2) compels the Procuracy to
produce any "exculpatory evidence" discovered before a verdict
is reached.
Although right to trial by jury is not provided in the Draft
Statute, any case brought before the ICC must be heard by a
Trial Chamber consisting of five ICC judges designated by the
Presidency.' To support a conviction or an acquittal, a mini-
mum of three Trial Chamber judges must agree.8 6 Under
Draft Statute Article 47, the court's sentencing options include
monetary fines and/or imprisonment either for a lifetime or a
specified term of years. However, the court is expressly forbid-
den from imposing the death penalty in any matter. 7 Finally,
the Draft Statute permits appellate review of Trial Chamber
decisions for both the accused and Prosecutor on grounds of
"procedural error, error of fact or law, or disproportion between
the crime and the sentence."8
E. The ICC and Trial in Absentia 9
Although the right to be present during one's own trial has
been guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and
82. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, at arts. 40, 41(1)(a).
83. Id. art. 41(1)(b).
84. Id. art. 41(c)-41(f). For further analysis of ICC provisions concerning the
right to be present at one's trial and trials in absentia, see Draft Statute, supra
note 5, art. 37; infra Parts Ill, IV.
85. Id. art. 45(2).
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 47. See also Commentary, supra note 5, 47(1) (expressly stating
that the "Court is not authorized to impose the death penalty").
88. Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 48(1).
89. Id. art. 37.
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Political Rights," the prohibition of trial in absentia is not
considered a fundamental international human right in the
criminal context." A recent human rights analysis by Profes-
sor Cherif M. Bassiouni of 139 national constitutions noted
that 25 nations prohibited trial in absentia; however, each
nation provided specific exceptions for when trial outside the
presence of the accused may occur.92 Ultimately, Professor
Bassiouni concludes that the right to be tried in one's own
presence is not a "core" international human right."
Unsurprisingly, the issue of permitting trial in absentia
has generated a fair amount of controversy amongst ICC com-
mentators. Indeed, the Commentary Section that follows Draft
Statute Article 37 makes no effort to conceal the fact that the
ILC delegates themselves hold divergent views on whether the
court should permit trials outside the presence of the ac-
cused.' "The question whether trial in absentia should be
permissible under the Statute has been extensively discussed
in the Commission, in the Sixth Committee and in the written
comments of Governments."95 Specifically, Article 37 states:
1. As a general rule, the accused should be present during
the trial.
2. The Trial Chamber may order that the trial proceed in
the absence of the accused if-
(a) the accused is in custody, or has been released
90. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967), at Pt. H, art. 14(3)(d).
91. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights In The Context of Criminal Jus-
tice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in
National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 235, 279-80 (1993). The "core
rights" are the right to life, liberty, and security of person; recognition and equal
protection before the law; freedom from arbitrary detention; freedom from torture;
right to be presumed innocent; right to a fair and speedy trial; right to assistance
of counsel; right to appeal; right to be protected from double jeopardy; and protec-
tion against ex-post facto laws. Id. at 292.
92. Id. at 279-80. For a discussion regarding the U.S. legal system's approach
to trial in absentia, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. See also infra Part IV.
93. Bassiouni, supra note 91, at 292.
94. See Commentary, supra note 5, art. 37(1).
95. Id.
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pending trial, and for reasons of security or the ill-
health of the accused it is undesirable for the ac-
cused to be present;
(b) the accused is continuing to disrupt the trial; or
(c) the accused has escaped from lawful custody under
this Statute or has broken bail.
3. The Chamber shall, if it makes an order under para-
graph 2, ensure that the rights of the accused under this
Statute are respected, and in particular:
(a) that all reasonable steps have been taken to inform
the accused of the charge; and
(b) that the accused is legally represented, if necessary
by a lawyer appointed by the Court.
1
4. In cases where a trial cannot be held because of the
deliberate absence of an accused, the Court may estab-
lish, in accordance with the Rules, an Indictment Cham-
ber for the purpose of:
(a) recording the evidence;
(b) considering whether the evidence establishes a
prima facie case of a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court; and publishing a warrant of arrest in
respect of an accused against whom a prima facie
case is established.
5. If the accused is subsequently tried under this Statute:
(a) the record of evidence before the Indictment Cham-
ber shall be admissible;
(b) any judge who was a member of the Indictment
Chamber may not be a member of the Trial Cham-
ber.
96
96. Commentary, supra note 5, art. 37.
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The Draft Statute Commentary discusses three different
views on this issue. One view "quite widely held" opposes any
provisions allowing for trials in absentia. Members of this
group argue that the court should only act where its judgment
and sentence can be implemented and that including provi-
sions for trials in absentia within the ICC Draft Statute will
ultimately tarnish the court's reputation as a legitimate penal
tribunal.98 While noting that the right to be present at one's
own trial is guaranteed by the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, the Commentary Section states that "trial
in absentia, to be consistent with human rights standards,
must be carefully regulated, with provisions for notification of
the accused, for setting aside the judgment and sentence on
subsequent appearance."99 The Commentary Section notes
further that "the presence of the accused at the trial is of vital
importance... " and that deviating from this guideline should
occur" 'only in exceptional cases.' "'o
There does not seem to be any dispute regarding the legiti-
macy of permitting trials to proceed in the absence of the ac-
cused when the accused is initially present at the beginning of
the trial and subsequently flees before the end of trial.'0 ' In-
deed, the American legal system permits trials to proceed un-
der these circumstances outside the presence of the ac-
cused.' The ICC provisions which generate the most criti-
cism in this area are those which permit a trial to continue
outside the presence of the accused "for reasons of security
or... ill-health... ."'o3 Aside from stating that the Trial
Chamber shall have the authority to order trials in absentia
pursuant to Article 37(2), the Draft Statute text and Commen-
tary Section both fail to articulate precisely what conditions or
findings are required to justify a trial in absentia pursuant to
the "security risk" or "ill-health" provisions in Draft Statute
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Commentary, supra note 5, 37(2), 37(3). See also Draft Statute, supra note
5, art. 37(3)(a)-(b).
100. Commentary, supra note 5, arts. 37(4), 37(5).
101. Id. art. 37(2)(c).
102. See FED. R. CldM. P. 43(b)(1). See also Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S.
255, 258 (1993). For discussion with regard to trials in absentia in the United
States legal system see infra Part IV.
103. Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37(2)(a); see also id. art. 37(5).
780 [Vol. XXIV:3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Article 37."° Another provision which has prompted criticism
permits the taking of evidence by an indictment chamber to
establish a prima facie case under the Court's jurisdiction
when the accused is intentionally absent.' This evidence
may be used by the Prosecution against the accused in the
event he/she is at some point apprehended.'
A number of legal commentators have voiced concerns
regarding the legitimacy of providing for trial in absentia in
the ICC Draft Statute. International law organizations such as
The Committee on International Law criticize the language
authorizing trials in absentia as "vague and overbroad... , "
and favor instead the approach taken by the drafters of the
Statute of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia which did
not include any provisions for trials in absentia.°7 Other or-
ganizations, like the Lawyers Human Rights Committee (Law-
yers Committee), assert that trial in absentia "as provided for
in the statute is especially troubling and would require sub-
stantial modification."' 8 Nevertheless, the Lawyers Commit-
tee does not categorically oppose permitting trials to proceed
outside the presence of the accused. For instance, the organiza-
tion would favor the continuation of trials where the accused
continually disrupts trial, but only "under strictly defined cir-
cumstances." 9
In addition to internationally renowned legal organiza-
tions, some experts with professional experience as members of
international criminal tribunals have questioned the provisions
of Draft Statute Article 37. In a recent address to the Prepara-
tory Committee on the ICC, the Honorable Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, a Judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, stated that the ICC "must comport with
the highest standards of fairness.""0 Judge McDonald then
remarked that in its present form Draft Statute Article 37 not
104. Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37; Commentary, supra note 5, 37(5).
105. Commentary, supra note 5, art. 37(4)-(5).
106. Id. In what was undoubtedly an effort to counterbalance any unfairness
caused by admitting incriminating evidence recorded outside the presence of the
accused, any judge sitting in the indictment chamber is precluded from later sit-
ting in a trial chamber for the accused.
107. Stoelting, supra note 63, at 113-114.
108. Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, supra note 81, at 23.
109. Id.
110. McDonald, supra note 81.
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only permits the taking of evidence by an Indictment Chamber
during the "deliberate absence of the accused," but also autho-
rizes its admissibility at a subsequent trial which essentially
denies the defendant's right to cross-examination guaranteed
by Draft Statute Article 41(e).'
Despite the vociferous manner in which opponents to trial
in absentia have come forward, this issue can hardly be char-
acterized as one-sided. Indeed, some ICC commentators, in-
cluding some ILC members and Government representatives,
nevertheless favor trial in absentia under the specific circum-
stances outlined in the proposed ICC." One argument states
that the overall policy goals advanced by the ICC and the inev-
itable difficulties it will confront in bringing international
criminals to justice support equipping the ICC with in absentia
authority.' This position emphasizes the distinctions be-
tween national courts and the proposed international tribunal.
Specifically, considerable power is allocated to national courts
and prosecutors in legal systems such as the United States "to
compel the defendant's presence at trial.""' Aside from the
wider array of resources available to national courts to ensure
a defendant's appearance at trial, there is also acceptance by
citizens within national legal systems that all crimes cannot be
prosecuted."5 In contrast, it is less likely that the world com-
munity will tolerate prosecutorial inaction in the case of geno-
cide or crimes against humanity. Thus, the more difficult task
of apprehending fugitives in the international context and the
nature of the crime at issue provide strong arguments for per-
mitting trials in absentia."'
A closer examination of the security risk provision in Draft
Statute Article 37(2)(a) raises some interesting questions. In-
deed, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the Court
is able to marshal the resources necessary to initiate an inves-
tigation, apprehend and indict a suspect and yet somehow not
111. Id. at 6-7; see also Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37.
112. See Commentary, supra note 5, art. 37(1).
113. Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional Aspects of An International Criminal Court,
9 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 27, 45-47 (1996).
114. Id. at 47; Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Com-
ment on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INTL L. 267, 268
(1994).
115. See Wedgwood, supra note 114.
116. Levitine, supra note 113, at 46-47.
[Vol. XXIV:3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
be able to guarantee that suspect's security at trial. The Draft
Statute, however, reveals that many important issues such as
the Court's relationship to the United Nations, the Court's
location, aid annual budget have been deferred pending a final
treaty conference." 7 Presumably, the President of the Court
will seek a State able to provide adequate facilities within the
Court's budget, and more importantly, a secure environment
for the Court to conduct its business. These lingering ambigu-
ities may have contributed to the inclusion of a provision al-
lowing for the Court to continue trial proceedings in the event
a security problem arises. It should be noted that Article 2
Commentary (7) states that although there has been disagree-
ment over the precise nature of the relationship between the
ICC and the United Nations, it was agreed that the relation-
ship will be a close one. Because this relationship necessarily
invokes the credibility of the United Nations, it is likely that
the site of the Court will be chosen with great care, and suffi-
cient resources will be allocated to guarantee the security of
the Court, its staff and the accused. Thus, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, like a global war, the chances of security
problems are likely to be remote.
Other ICC proponents respond to critics opposed to trial in
absentia by arguing that it is both unnecessary and unwise to
apply rigid constitutional principles to the ICC."' Specifical-
ly, advocates of this position assert that such a narrow view
would serve only to thwart the Court's objectives and permit
"the accused who chooses not to appear before the court...
[to] evade justice with impunity.""' Indeed, in absentia au-
thority seems aimed at targeting the accused who deliberately
avoids prosecution either by hiding or receiving aid from a
friendly government.'2
Judicial and prosecutorial efficiency are additional factors
to consider in support of trial in absentia authority.'2 ' Allow-
ing the accused to halt an investigation or a trial because that
person successfully evades capture or accepts protection from a
non-participating government has several consequences. First,
117. See Commentary, supra note 5, arts. 2(7) & 2(8).
118. See Levitine, supra note 113, at 47.
119. Id.
120. See Marquardt, supra note 9, at 134-35.
121. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261 (1993).
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the more time that passes, the less likely a successful prosecu-
tion will take place. It is well-settled that delays during inves-
tigations or trials are costly and result in a reduction in the
effectiveness of witness testimony which deteriorates as a
result of memory loss or death. 2 Moreover, time delays pro-
vide greater opportunities for the loss, destruction and fabrica-
tion of evidence.' Overall, this position correctly notes that
because of the ICC's "international character" and functions it
should not be subjected to exacting constitutional analysis as if
the ICC were equivalent to a domestic tribunal."
IV. TRIAL IN ABSENTIA AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL
SYSTEM
In the United States, the right to be present at one's own
trial is guaranteed by the confrontation clause within the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution which states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
Indeed, the confrontation clause, which guarantees criminal
defendants the right to face their accusers, would substantially
lose its meaning if banning criminal defendants from their own
trials became a routine occurrence. Despite the constitutional
foundation of the right to be present at one's trial, there are
exceptions to this guarantee.'26  In Crosby v. United
States,2" the United States Supreme Court held that trials
could take place in the absence of the accused provided that
the accused was initially present and at some point "is volun-
122. See Wedgwood, supra note 114, at 269.
123. Id.
124. See Levitine, supra note 113, at 43. But cf Draft Statute, supra note 5, at
preamble (discussing the complementary jurisdiction the court will have as an
extension of national courts).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b), 43(c).
127. 506 U.S. 255 (1993).
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tarily absent after the trial has commenced." 2 ' While declin-
ing to rule on the constitutionality of a conviction reached
outside the presence of a voluntarily absent defendant, the
Court unanimously determined that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 43, hereinafter Rule 43, "prohibits the trial in absen-
tia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of tri-
al." 9 Interestingly, the Court's unequivocal holding in Cros-
by has created a bright line rule prohibiting trials when the
defendant has not made an initial appearance and, created
what some have derisively characterized as a "right to pre-trial
flight."
130
Notably, Rule 43 does not merely govern exceptions to
when a defendant's presence at trial is required. Indeed, the
first sentence of Rule 43 discusses the basic requirement that
the defendant be present "at the arraignment, at the time of
the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of
the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
the sentence . ... "13' The relevant exceptions to this general
requirement are when the defendant is voluntarily absent after
the trial has commenced,12 and when the defendant contin-
ues to interrupt court proceedings after being admonished by
the court that such behavior will result in that defendant's "re-
moval.., from the courtroom....
Requiring the defendant's presence at the beginning of
trial allows the court to find that a subsequent voluntary ab-
sence represents an informed waiver of the defendant's right to
be present during trial."4 In contrast, the Crosby Court found
that the defendant who has never appeared in court should not
be subjected to trial in absentia based on the possibility that
the defendant could merely be unaware that a trial is proceed-
ing in his/her absence."' Additionally, the Court put forth
other policy arguments in favor of distinguishing between pre-
128. Id. at 258.
129. Id. at 262.
130. See generally Christopher T. Igielski, Washington Defendant's New Right of
Pre-Trial Flight, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 633 (1996).
131. See FED. R. CRIM P. 43(a).
132. Id. 43(b)(1).
133. Id. 43(b)(3); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Draft Statute, supra
note 5, art. 37(2)(b).
134. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261 (1993).
135. Id. at 262.
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trial and mid-trial flight. First, it is a greater drain on judicial
resources to halt a trial. already in progress compared to delay-
ing a trial that has not begun."6 Second, the distinction de-
prives defendants of the dual benefit of waiting for a possible
acquittal or ending a trial headed for conviction by fleeing or
disrupting court proceedings.' 7
Because the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 43 to provide
an exclusive list of exceptions to the general requirement that
defendants be present at all proceedings, a comparison be-
tween Rule 43 and Draft Statute Article 37 is necessary.
138
Both the ICC Draft Statute and Rule 43 permit trials in absen-
tia when the accused has fled the jurisdiction after a trial has
commenced, and when the conduct of the accused is disrupting
court proceedings. 139 At that point, however, the similarities
end. As discussed earlier, Draft Statute Article 37 permits
trials in absentia upon a finding by the trial chamber that "for
reasons of security ... of the accused it is undesirable for the
accused to be present."4 ° With regard to security, no excep-
tion is incorporated into Rule 43. It should be recalled that the
Crosby decision interpreted the exceptions enumerated in Rule
136. Id. at 262. See also Igielski, supra note 130, at 652 (distinguishing be-
tween pre-trial flight and mid-trial flight).
137. See Igielski, supra note 130, at 652.
138. See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261. Specifically, the exceptions for when the
presence of the defendant is not required include "whenever the defendant, initial-
ly present at trial, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, (1) is voluntarily
absent after the trial has commenced . . . , (2) in a noncapital case, is voluntarily
absent at the imposition of the sentence, or (3) after being warned by the court
that disruptive conduct will cause the removal of the defendant from the
courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the court-
room." FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(1) to 41(b)(3). In addition, a defendant's presence is
also not required "(1) when [defendant] represented by counsel and the defendant
is an organization ... ; (2) when the offense is punishable by fine or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year or both and the court, with the written consent
of the defendant, permits arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence in
the defendant's absence; (3) when the proceeding involves only a conference or
hearing upon a question of law; or (4) when the proceeding involves a correction
of sentence . . . ." Id.
139. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37(2)(c). See also FED. R. CRIM. P.
43(b)(1) to 43(b)(3). Note that Rule 43 requires the federal judge to issue a warn-
ing to the disruptive defendant that his/her conduct is unacceptable and if it con-
tinues will result in removal from the courtroom; whereas the ICC Draft Statute
does not require a warning to be issued before the accused may be removed from
the courtroom. Id
140. Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37(2)(a).
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43 as being exclusive and not illustrative." Based on the
Crosby ruling, in the event a court held a trial or even part of
a trial in absentia based on an inability to guarantee the
defendant's security, a showing would have to be made that
this situation is provided for under Rule 43. The omission of a
security risk exception in Rule 43 can be attributed to the fact
that American courts have access to powerful law enforcement
agencies at the local, state and federal level, and recalls essen-
tial distinctions between national legal systems and interna-
tional. tribunals. In contrast, the inclusion of the security
risk provision in the ICC Draft Statute, which has been char-
acterized as vague, may reflect a concern that the ICC will be
unable to rely on such formidable enforcement agencies.
There is also no provision within Rule 43 for continuing a
trial outside the presence of the accused based on that person's
ill-health which is authorized under the ICC Draft Statute.'"
Quite the contrary, a criminal trial taking place in the United
States would almost certainly grind to a halt under such cir-
cumstances because the constitution "forbids trial of one who,
for whatever reason, is unfit to assist in his own defense be-
cause the U.S. adversarial system of justice depends on vigor-
ous defenses." 45 The Draft Statute does not elaborate on
whether both physical and mental illness would be taken into
consideration in determining whether "it is undesirable for the
accused to be present."46 Under the American legal system,
however, such a distinction is unnecessary because it is prohib-
ited to try defendants who are found to be mentally ill regard-
less of their ability to be present in the courtroom.1
47
A closer examination of the Rule 43 exceptions reveal an
underlying theme of voluntary action on the part of the ac-
cused. Specifically, Rule 43(b)(1) states that "the defendant will
141. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 258-59.
142. See Wedgwood, supra note 114, at 268.
143. See Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, supra note 81.
144. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37(2)(a).
145. Edmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (holding a defendant has a due process right
not to be tried if he is unable to assist in his own defense).
146. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37(2)(a).
147. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (holding that "the mentally
incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality
afforded no opportunity to defend himself').
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be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever
a defendant... is voluntarily absent after the trial has com-
menced." Similarly, the exceptions authorizing trial in absentia
during sentencing in a noncapital case and after the removal of
a disruptive defendant focus on the voluntary conduct of the
defendant. 4" Moreover, the notion of voluntary conduct on
the part of the defendant who waives the right to be present
was discussed by the Crosby Court during its interpretation of
Rule 43.149
Application of the Crosby decision to the ICC security
risk/ill-health provisions for trial in absentia might pass one
Crosby hurdle if the ICC provisions specified that the security
risk/ill-health provisions applied only after the accused makes
an initial appearance. However, these ICC provisions are nev-
ertheless in conflict with the rest of the Crosby analysis which
emphasizes that the exceptions for permitting trial in absentia
are limited to those expressly provided for in Rule 43.15' Fur-
thermore, it is unlikely that the security risk/ill-health provi-
sions can be found to comport with the spirit of Rule 43 excep-
tions which all involve the accused demonstrating via conduct
that he/she knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to be
present for trial. 5'
V. RECONCILING ICC PROVISIONS FOR TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
WITH U.S. LAW
The following section will argue that in spite of the appar-
ent conflict between prevailing United States law and the ICC
on provisions for trial in absentia, the United States can and
should be a full-fledged member of the proposed international
criminal court and can do so without having to sacrifice any
constitutional guarantees. This section will propose the follow-
ing three points in support of United States membership in the
ICC pursuant to the current Draft Statute. First, the ICC is
not an Article III Court pursuant to the U.S. Constitution and
therefore the nation may pursue ICC membership without
having to guarantee full constitutional rights afforded to U.S.
148. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(2) to 43(b)(3).
149. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261 (1993); Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442 (1912).
150. See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 258-59.
151. Id. at 261.
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citizens in domestic Article III Courts.'52 Second, although
the United States opposition to trial in absentia does have
constitutional foundations, this is not an unconditional guaran-
tee. A balancing test between the weight of U.S. opposition to
trial in absentia and that of policy objectives advanced by U.S.
participation within an ICC equipped with in absentia authori-
ty tips in favor of the ICC. Third, the security risk/ill-health
provisions could be omitted from the final ICC charter, or at
the very least, explicated in greater detail prior to a final trea-
ty conference.
Perhaps the easiest way to solve the dilemma raised by
the conflict between provisions for trial in absentia under the
ICC and U.S. law is to avoid the issue in its entirety by de-
scribing the ICC as a non-Article III court which is therefore
not required to adhere to U.S. law.5 ' The U.S. Constitution
states:
[tihe judicial power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges,
both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behaviour, and shall... receive.., a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office."
Application of this criteria lends support to the above conten-
tion as the ICC is not created by the U.S. Congress, nor are
ICC judges nominated by the U.S. President.'55 Furthermore,
advocates of this view like Paul D. Marquardt assert that the
ICC will operate under its own authority, or more generally,
under the authority of the entire international community, and
thus cannot be held to be an Article III Court.' Marquardt
also argues that the ICC would not trigger Article III status
even in the event the United States investigated and detained
suspects for the ICC.'57 Finally, this argument stands on sol-
id Supreme Court precedent established by Hirota v.
152. See Levitine, supra note 113, at 43.
153. Id. See Marquardt, supra note 9, at 104-106.
154. U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 1 (emphasis added).
155. See generally Draft Statute, supra note 5.
156. See Marquardt, supra note 9, at 106.
157. Id.; but cf Scharf, supra note 4, at 116.
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MacArthur,'58 where the Court held that the Tokyo Tribunal,
established under the authority of U.S. Supreme Allied Com-
mander General Douglas C. MacArthur, "is not a tribunal of
the United States." 59
Although the above Article III argument puts forth a com-
pelling argument that would effectively moot any constitution-
al claim against a international tribunal, 60 the ICC's comple-
mentary jurisdiction provision, as it is employed within the
Draft Statute, characterizes the ICC as a projection of national
courts, which in the United States require full constitutional
protection to all criminal defendants.'6 ' The notion of comple-
mentary jurisdiction was included in the Draft Statute to allow
States to circumvent constitutional or statutory barriers
against surrendering their own nationals to a foreign tribu-
nal. 62 With regard to the United States, such an interpreta-
tion essentially transforms the ICC into an Article III court by
equating it with national courts which are, of course, governed
by Article III. To avert this dilemma, ICC commentators sug-
gest that the ICC declare that the "surrender of an accused to
the ICC is an extradition."6 ' Notwithstanding the attractive
escape hatch this tactic offers, such a course would create a
variety of other problems. For instance, deleting complementa-
ry jurisdiction from the ICC will tie the hands of nations for
which the surrendering of an accused to a foreign tribunal is
statutorily forbidden.' Complementary jurisdiction is also
important on a policy level as it imparts a definite sense of
national affiliation between the ICC and each member state's
national court system. In essence, complementary jurisdiction
is another method of promoting the ICC's legitimacy in the
world community.'65
A second argument in support of U.S. acceptance of ICC in
absentia provisions utilizes a balancing test weighing U.S.
158. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
159. See Marquardt supra note 9, at 106 (quoting Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198).
160. See Marquardt, supra note 9, at n.132.
161. See Scharf, supra note 4; see also Draft Statute, supra note 5, at pream-
ble, pt. IH(ll).
162. Draft Statute, supra note 5, at preamble, pt. H1(11).
163. See Scharf, supra note 4. See also Levitine, supra note 113, at 41-42 (sug-
gesting that the court's jurisdiction be interpreted as "sui generis").
164. See Levitine, supra note 113, at 41-42.
165. See generally supra Part II.
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opposition to trial in absentia against the policy objectives in
favor of equipping the ICC with in absentia authority.'66 On
one side of this balancing scale is the American constitutional
tradition which requires defendants to be present at criminal
trials and affords them the opportunity to confront their accus-
ers in public. 67 As noted above, however, this tradition, while
significant, is by no means an iron-clad guarantee for all defen-
dants in all situations."
At the opposite end of the scale, the following factors col-
lectively outweigh the infringement on U.S. law caused by ICC
provisions for trial in absentia: (1) the political significance of
securing U.S. membership in the ICC is critical to its effective-
ness;69 (2) the unique difficulties presented by prosecuting
international criminal conspiracies, coupled with the distinc-
tions between domestic and international legal systems, justi-
fies flexible provisions for trial in absentia;'7 6 (3) the impor-
tance of establishing the ICC as a credible legal authority with
the capability to finish trials should not be thwarted by defen-
dants who would benefit from having a trial delayed or possi-
bly halted indefinitely because of security problems or illness-
es; 71 and (4) the significant procedural guarantees afforded
to ICC defendants and the general requirement that defen-
dants be present at all trial proceedings suggest that ICC de-
fendants will receive fair trials and that the occurrence of trial
in absentia will be rare.72 Taken together, these four factors
tip the scale in favor of U.S. membership in the ICC with the
provisions for trial in absentia intact.
A final approach the ILC members could take to ensure
U.S. agreement on the issue of trial in absentia is to amend
166. U.S. judges frequently employ the balancing test as a judicial device which
permits courts to consider public policy objectives and other factors in resolving
multi-issue legal questions. See, e.g., Barker
' v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)
(setting forth a four factor balancing test to determine whether a defendant's right
to a speedy trial pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) had been violated. The four
factors are "length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant). Id.
167. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 43; see generally supra
Part M.
168. See supra Part IV.
169. See Scharf, supra note 4, at 109.
170. See Wedgwood, supra note 114; supra Part IH.
171. See Wedgwood, supra note 114, at 269.
172. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, arts. 37, 40 & 41(1)(a); supra Part II.
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the language of Article 37. One possibility is to omit entirely
the security risk/ill-health language.13 Despite the logical ap-
peal of this option, the fact that heated debate occurred over
the issue indicates that a substantial number of ILC delegates
would undoubtedly have strong reservations against deleting
significant .portions of Article 37.174 Accordingly, a more real-
istic option would be to elucidate in greater detail what is
meant by the security risk/ill health provisions in Draft Stat-
ute Article 37. For instance, with regard to ill-health, a provi-
sion may be proposed stating that a physically debilitated
defendant who is unable to appear in court must be afforded
appearance at his/her trial by video conference with access to
counsel. Included in this provision should be language requir-
ing a minimum level of mental and physical competence on the
part of the defendant. 75 Thus, a defendant who is physically
or mentally debilitated to the point that he/she cannot mean-
ingfully comprehend what is happening, or assist in his/her de-
fense should not be tried under such conditions. To accomplish
this important objective, ILO delegates need to adopt provi-
sions and standards for physical and mental evaluations.7 '
With regard to the security provision, the Draft Statute
could be improved further by requiring a majority of the Trial
Chamber judges to determine that circumstances had reached
a point where security for the accused cannot be guaranteed
before a trial could proceed in absentia. This procedure could
be supplemented by mandatory appellate review of a security
risk determination by either the ICC President or a special
Appellate Chamber. Delays caused by including these proce-
dural requirements will be negligible and significantly improve
the Draft Statute in its current form.
Following completion of this Note, a final treaty conference
was held in Rome, Italy from June 5, 1998 until July 17, 1998
at which a revised draft statute was created.'77 Interestingly,
the Rome Statute's provision dealing with the presence of the
accused at trial reads:
173. See Lawyers Human Rights Committee, supra note 81.
174. See Commentary, supra note 5, art. 37(1).
175. See Drope, 420 U.S. 162.
176. Id.
177. See International Criminal Court Homepage (visited Nov. 14, 1998), supra
note 2.
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Trial in the presence of the accused
1. The accused shall be present during the trial.
2. If the accused, being present before the Court, continues
to disrupt the trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the
accused and shall make provision for him or her to ob-
serve the trial and instruct counsel from outside the
courtroom, through the use of communications technolo-
gy, if required. Such measures shall be taken only in
exceptional circumstances after other reasonable alterna-
tives have proved inadequate, and only for such duration
as is strictly required."8
Notably, the ill-health/security risk provisions in Draft
Statute Article 37 have been omitted. In addition, the revised
language in the Rome Statute does not address the issue of
trial in absentia in the event that the accused absconds after
arrest and/or the commencement of proceedings. However,
Rome Statute Article 61(2) authorizes the Pre-Trial Chamber
on its own or on a motion from the Prosecutor to:
hold a hearing in the absence of the person charged to con-
firm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek
trial when the person has:
(a) Waived his or her right to be present; or
(b) Fled or cannot be found and all reasonable steps have
been taken to secure his or her appearance before the
Court and to inform the person of the charges and that a
hearing to confirm those charges will be held. In that
case, the person shall be represented by counsel where
the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that is in the inter-
ests of justice."'
The Rome Statute thus retained in absentia authority for
178. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 63
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
179. Id. art. 61(2).
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the Prosecutor to announce the charges against a defendant
who has waived the right to be present either via an informed
waiver or via intentional flight from justice. It is unclear
whether this in absentia authority at the indictment stage
would be available at the trial level. An examination of the
Rome Statute and comparison to the previous ICC Draft Stat-
ute suggest that a trial could not proceed under the Rome
Draft Statute if the accused fled during the indictment stage or
even at some point after commencement of the trial proceed-
ings. 80 In its current form, the Rome Statute has deleted
express ICC authority to prosecute a defendant who flees after
judicial proceedings have begun. It should be recalled that the
Draft Statute expressly provided such in absentia authori-
ty.8 ' Indeed, the only scenario contemplated in the Rome
Statute for trial to continue outside the presence of the accused
is when the accused disrupts the proceedings.'82 Moreover,
this authority is limited to "exceptional circumstances" and
entitles the accused to video conferencing and instruction from
counsel during his/her absence "after other reasonable alterna-
tives have proved inadequate, and for only such duration as is
strictly required. "Accordingly, it appears from the most re-
cent Draft Statute that the ICC delegates have opted against
broad in absentia authority and limited its use to extremely
narrow circumstances. The Court should retain in absentia
authority to try defendants who abscond after initial judicial
proceedings have commenced. This may be implicit in article
61(2) of the Rome Statute, or simply an oversight which should
be amended.
VI. CONCLUSION
Few will dispute the contention that the time for a perma-
nent international criminal court is long overdue. The ongoing
prosecutions and personal accounts of unspeakable crimes
against mankind being recorded by the ICTFY and ICTR re-
mind us that the specter of international atrocity is not con-
fined to the World War II era and that it will undoubtedly rear
180. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 178, art. 63, with Draft Statute, supra
note 5, art. 37.
181. See Draft Statute, supra note 5, art. 37.
182. See Rome Statute, supra note 178, art. 63(2).
183. Id.
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its ugly head in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, the re-
cent campaign to establish a permanent international court
should continue until the ICC becomes reality. In light of the
United States' position as the sole global superpower, securing
its membership is an absolute necessity for the ICC.1"
In this Note, I have examined the right to be present at
one's own trial. Notwithstanding the revised language in the
Rome Statute, the Draft Statute provisions differ at certain
points from U.S. exceptions for permitting trials to proceed
outside the presence of the accused. While deserving serious
scrutiny and amendments to shed additional light on their
intent, these ICC provisions do not merit U.S. rejection of ICC
membership. Apart from declaring a general requirement that
defendants be present during all stages of trial, the ICC pro-
vides an impressive assortment of individual rights and proce-
dural requirements which in many respects mirror U.S. proce-
dural guarantees that criminal defendants receive fair trials.
Finally, it should not be overlooked that an equally important
ICC objective is to deter future international criminal conduct.
It will be difficult, if not impossible, to attain this goal if defen-
dants are permitted to benefit by intentional flight or security
risks outside the control of the Court.
Over fifty years have passed since the end of the Second
World War during which some of the most unimaginable
crimes were perpetuated against humanity. Sadly, the horrific
actions committed in Nazi Germany were essentially duplicat-
ed, albeit by different actors, in Cambodia, the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda during this last quarter of the twentieth-cen-
tury. In light of these awful tragedies and the looming nuclear
threat currently threatening Indonesia, it is indeed foolhardy
for anyone to presume that the darkest chapters of this centu-
ry cannot be repeated. The need for the ICC today and for the
next century is, therefore, abundantly clear. With regard to
United States membership in the ICC, the prospect of commit-
184. See Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong.,
2d Sess. (July 23, 1998) (Testimony of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for
war crimes issues and head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Con-
ference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court.
Scheffer attributes the U.S. delegation's failure to support the July 17 draft in
Rome to unresolved jurisdictional concerns, the definition of the crime of aggres-
sion, and provisions allowing the ICC Prosecutor to unilaterally commence investi-
gations with the consent of two judges).
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ting the nation and its citizens to such an historic endeavor
should not be taken lightly. Overall, the ICC is an institution
which incorporates the essential components of the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system and recognizes the importance of ensuring
fairness to defendants. Accordingly, the ICC is an institution
which deserves the full support and membership of the United
States.
Daniel J. Brown
